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Abstract: This paper evaluates the forward premium puzzle using the Euro ex-
change rate. Unlike previous studies, our analysis utilizes time-varying parameter
methods and is based on two approaches for evaluation of the puzzle; the traditional
approach analyzing the sensitivity of interest rate di¤erentials to the forward pre-
mium, and the other looking into deviations from the covered interest rate parity
(CIRP) condition. Then we provide evidence that the forward premium puzzle in-
deed became more prominent around the time of the recent crisis periods such as
the Lehman Shock and the Euro crisis. This is also shown to be consistent with a
deterioration in the CIRP.
JEL classication: F31, F36
Keywords: forward premium puzzle, risk premium, time-varying parameters, -
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1 Introduction
The forward premium puzzle can be regarded broadly as a violation of the Covered
Interest Rate Parity (CIRP) condition which suggests an equi-proportional rela-
tionship between the forward premium and interest rate di¤erentials. Despite the
popularity of the CIRP in international nance however, there is mounting evidence
against this theoretical prediction (e.g., Fama 1984). According to a survey of pre-
vious studies which focused largely on advanced countries (Froot and Thaler 1990),
the CIRP relationship is often negative; the average size of this parameter reported
in previous studies is -0.88. Due to the pervasive implications of this bias to open
market economic theories,1 a lot of research has been carried out in the past to seek
explanations of the forward premium puzzle and the failure of the CIRP.
Among others, previous studies point to several sources of the violation of the
CIRP. One reason is related to the risk premium, which relaxes the assumption of the
CIRP about investorsrisk neutrality and introduces their risk aversion behaviors
in the model. Indeed, recent studies (e.g., Co¤ey et al 2009) have pointed out
that counterparty risk has become a driving force for CIRP deviations during the
Lehman Shock. They have also argued that these deviations were lessoned when
the Federal Reserves increased the US$ supply by means of a currency swap, and
therefore the risk premium seems to be closely associated with liquidity constraints.
Second, the presence of transaction costs may prevent investors from trading even
when there is a prot opportunity based on the CIRP criterion (Peel and Taylor
2002). This is another classic explanation of the violation of the CIRP and has
been analyzed using the threshold model which allows to di¤erentiate ranges in
which prices may or may not make adjustments. The third reason is connected with
the di¤erent timing of data quotations. Since research requires several economic
indicators and is conducted in an international context, the data are likely recorded
at di¤erent times. Actually when the consistently quoted data are used for analysis,
more evidence is reported in favor of the CIRP (Taylor 1989).
Although there is a link with explanations of the CIRP deviations, more direct
economic reasons exist for the forward premium puzzle. For example, recent studies
have pointed out that the currency carry trade strategy is related to the puzzle (e.g.,
Menkho¤ et al 2012). That is to say, when an interest rate is low and is perceived as
likely to last for some time, investors borrow money in the low interest rate country
1For example, the CIRP is considered the most appropriate economic theory for measuring
international nancial mobility (Frankel 1992).
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and purchase nancial assets in a high interest rate country. Therefore, there is an
increase in demand for foreign currency, and as a result a low interest rate country
will experience currency depreciation. Furthermore, recent research, often referred
to as the market microstructure model, emphasizes the role of private information in
explaining exchange rate movements (e.g., Burnside et al, 2009). This departs from
the standard CIRP model which is based on public information, and when order
ow data are included in the model to capture private information there is evidence
of improvements in the interest parity relationship (e.g., Evans and Lyons 2002).2
Against this background, we analyze, by focusing on the risk premium and CIRP
deviations, whether or not this puzzle has become more signicant during recent pe-
riods. To our knowledge, although some economic explanations have been provided
about the forward premium puzzle, few attempts have been made to clarify its rela-
tionship with CIRP derivations or investigate whether this puzzle during the crises
is indeed statistically di¤erent from that in normal times. Using advanced statistical
methods, we shall investigate these issues by including sample periods which contain
information on the European debt crisis which kicked o¤ in Greece in 2009.3
This paper consists of four more sections. In the next section, we explain fur-
ther the concept of the forward premium puzzle and its empirical evidence, based
on previous literature. Section 3 discusses the key data used in our paper; namely
exchange rates and interest rates, and furthermore estimates the time-varying for-
ward premium puzzle by employing a state space model. Section 4 analyzes whether
the CIRP deviations have indeed increased in size during the recent crises and have
become an explanation for the more signicant forward premium puzzle, using the
Markov-switching (MS) model with time-varying transition probabilities. This pa-
per ends with a summary of our ndings in Section 5.
2 Forward Premium Puzzle
The forward premium puzzle is one of the great unsolved research topics, rst pointed
out by Fama (1984), in international nance. Fama discussed this puzzle mainly
in the context of the relationship between the forward premium and exchange rate
changes, and most previous research (see Froot and Frankel 1989, Hall et al 2011) has
2Needless to say, evidence of the CIRP does not mean that there are no arbitrage opportunities.
It only suggests that on average the CIRP is an appropriate economic concept.
3Our focus on the risk premium is partly due to our lack of access to order ow data, and our
relatively low (monthly) frequency data are prone to be less sensitive to the timing of quotations.
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investigated Famas specication partly because of easier access to data. However,
we will conduct research in the framework of the forward premium and interest
rates, which is more often cited in introductory textbooks and does not hinge upon
investorsrationality. It is attractive to use this CIRP since the rational expectations
assumption is normally required for the derivation of the Famas specication but
is not well supported by actual data (MacDonald and Torrance 1990).
The CIRP implies the equalization of returns from investment at home and
abroad under the assumption of no risk premium. The di¤erence in these invest-
ment strategies arises only from the currency denomination of nancial assets. More
specically, let us consider the following standard linear time-series CIRP relation-
ship for di¤erent forward contract periods (j).
fpjt = + 1eit + et (1)
The fpjt is the forward premium (fp
j
t = f
j
t   st) at time t, where the spot and
jth-period forward exchange rates are expressed in natural logarithmic form as s
and f respectively. The interest rate di¤erential is shown as ei (i.e., eit = ijt   ijt ),
and the asterisk indicates a foreign variable. Greek letters are parameters to be
estimated, and e is the residual. When the CIRP is an appropriate concept, a
parameter restriction (1 = 1) must be supported by the data. The analysis of 1
is probably the most orthodox method for the evaluation of the forward premium
puzzle, and it is here called a direct approach.
As referred to in the Introduction, the forward premium puzzle is often reported
as being present in recent data among advanced countries (i.e., 1 < 1); furthermore,
this puzzle is more serious in advanced countries than in developing countries (Bansal
and Dahlquist 2000; Frankel and Poonawala, 2010).4 Bansal and Dahlquist (2000),
for example, argued that countries with high per capita income and low ination
the characteristics of advanced countries tend to su¤er more seriously from this
bias.
As an indirect approach, the forward premium puzzle can also be analyzed by
examining a deviation from the CIRP (Devt) and the risk premium (Rpt). For
brevity, assuming that data are demeaned, their relationship can be expressed as:
Devt = eit   fpt (2)
Devt = f(Rpt) where f 0 < 0
4See Engel (1996) for a comprehensive survey of the forward premium anomaly.
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In normal times, the expected value of Dev and Rp is zero. However, during
crises, the interest rate di¤erential is not enough to o¤set fp, and thus the risk
premium will become necessary to compensate increased uncertainty when making
investments at home (say in Europe). Thus in our setting (Eq. 2), this will result in
a rise in Rp and a decline in CIRP deviations. This relationship can be interpreted as
the fact that an increase in the risk premium will weaken the relationship between fp
and i i, i.e., a decline in 1 in Eq. 1, other things being constant, thereby providing
evidence of the forward premium puzzle. On the other hand, an increase in Dev
implies that 1 will be greater than one, which is not in line with previous evidence
of the forward premium puzzle. Thus, this residual-based approach to evaluate the
forward premium puzzle is di¤erent from the conventional method based on Eq. 1,
but we should still be able to obtain consistent results with the conventional one.
To our knowledge, there is no study providing clear evidence of the forward
premium puzzle by examining the size of CIRP deviations. For example, increases
in CIRP deviations in the summer of 2007 due to the sub-prime loan problem were
argued to be linked with credit and counterparty risk (Baba and Packer 2008, Co¤ey
et al 2009, Levich 2011). Co¤ey et al (2009) and Gri¤oli and Panaldo (2011) suggest
insu¢ cient liquidity in the nancial market as an explanation of sizable deviations
from the CIRP during the Lehman Shock.5 Furthermore, Peel and Taylor (2002)
analyzed CIRP deviations during the 1920s using the threshold autoregressive (TAR)
model in order to take account of transaction costs which prevent trading. But these
studies have no direct relevance to the forward premium puzzle.
3 Forward Premium Puzzle under Investigation:
A Direct Approach
This section empirically analyzes the forward premium puzzle based on a direct
approach, i.e., Eq. 1. However, unlike previous studies, the state-space model is
employed to calculate the time-varying parameter (1). In this way, we can highlight
the degree to which the forward premium puzzle has varied over time. Prior to the
estimation of this model, we shall explain our key data and conduct some preliminary
analyses.
5There are, however, many other explanations for the forward premium puzzle. For example,
using the Fama-type statistical relationship, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) argue that small sample
problems and price rigidities can cause the forward premium puzzle. Furthermore, Bacchetta and
van Wincoop (2010) point to infrequent portfolio adjustments as a reason for the puzzle.
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Our data are monthly and cover the sample period from 1999M1-2012M4 for the
Euro/US$ exchange rates (see Appendix). The beginning of the sample period is
determined by the timing of the creation of the Euro, and this pair of currencies
is chosen since they are most frequently traded by nancial institutions in foreign
exchange markets (Bank for International Settlements 2010). Furthermore the re-
cent nancial crises (i.e., the Lehman Shock and Greek sovereign debt crisis) are
deeply rooted in these regions. The interest rates are the London Interbank O¤ered
Rates (LIBOR), the most widely used reference rates for the short-term, and cover
maturity lengths of 1, 2, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months (i.e., j = 1; 2; 3; 6; 9; 12).6 While
longer contracts are available, our main focus goes to relatively short-term rates
(i.e., a less than one year maturity) since the majority of forward transactions are
of less than one month maturity length (Bank for International Settlements 2010).
The forward premium and interest rate data are expressed in terms of annual
rates and are summarized in tables. Table 1 shows the basic statistics of the forward
premium and interest rate di¤erentials for a variety of maturity lengths. In this
table, the average value of these variables is reported to be negative, suggesting
that the spot exchange rate was on average higher than the forward rate, and the
US interest rate was higher than the European rate. Furthermore, the sizes of
the forward premium and the interest rate di¤erentials both increase along with
maturity length, reecting the higher likelihood of changes in these variables over
longer time horizons. With respect to their variation in terms of the standard error
(SE), interest rate di¤erentials are more homogeneous than forward premiums whose
variation declines more prominently along with maturity length. The high volatility
of shorter maturities normally reects their high trading volume.
Table 2 reports correlation coe¢ cients obtained for the forward premium and
interest rate di¤erentials. It turns out that the correlation level between forward
premiums and between interest rates with di¤erent maturities is very highmore
than 90%. Furthermore, a high correlation between forward premiums and interest
rate di¤erentials is reported in the table.
As a further preliminary analysis, Table 3 shows the OLS estimates of the CIRP
using the Newey-West method in order to make an adjustment for autocorrelation.
The estimates of 1 are reported to be positive, and thus the severity of the forward
premium puzzle seems to be lessened compared with one using older observations
6The quality of the LIBOR has been questioned recently (July 2012) as some banks allegedly
indulged in illegal operations in order to manipulate this rate. However, the LIBOR is very
comprehensive in terms of maturities.
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which often yielded a negative sign (Fama 1984, Froot and Frankel 1989). However,
the unitary parameter restriction on 1 is statistically rejected in all cases in the
full sample, conrming the presence of the forward premium puzzle as reported in
previous literature.
Having experienced nancial crises, the full sample analysis may su¤er from
structural breaks. In this regard, we conduct two types of instability test; the
Andrews-Quandt and Andrews-Ploberger tests, in order to examine the null hy-
pothesis that 1 is invariant over time. The statistics are based on OLS estimates
but are adjusted for heteroschedasticity, and since these tests do not follow the con-
ventional distribution, p-values are obtained using the statistical method proposed
by Hansen (1997). Table 3 reports results from these tests which are conducted
for the trimmed sample period, and shows that this null is strongly rejected in all
cases.7 In addition, the table provides evidence of a structural break at the time
of the Lehman Shock (2008M9). This break date is identied by the most extreme
value of F statistic (i.e., the smallest p-value), and the presence of structural breaks
is consistent with a violation of the CIRP during the recent period (e.g., Levich
2011).
Using this information of a break date, we divide the full sample into two periods,
and carry out sub-sample analysis. Our results show that there is a substantial
di¤erence between 1 from di¤erent regimes. The size of this parameter turns out
to be much smaller for all maturities after the Lehman Shock, indicating a further
deterioration of the CIRP condition in recent observations. In contrast, while our
data support the presence of the forward premium in most cases, there are two
instances where a unitary restriction on 1 is accepted by the statistical test from
observations prior to the Lehman Shock. Thus our results also imply a relatively
more severe forward premium puzzle during the recent crisis period.
Finally, in order to illustrate time-dependent bias, we estimate the time-varying
parameter, 1, as in Eq. 3 using the Kalman lter with a state space model. The
Kalman ltering method is widely used in many research elds such as engineering,
but today it is also used in nance too. This method assumes a linear dynamic
system to obtain unobservable components (t and 1t).
7The rst and last 15% of observations are trimmed in order to carry out these tests.
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fpjt = t + 1teit + et (3)
1t = 1t 1 + "t
t = t 1 + zt
where et  N(0; Vt) and "t; zt  N(0;Wt), and these residuals are internally and
mutually independent (see Appendix for explanations about the Kalman ltering
method). The unobserved time-varying components are assumed to follow a random
walk process.
The estimates of 1t which are of interest to us, are shown for all maturities in
Fig. 1, raising two interesting points. First, consistent with the results in Table 3,
it suggests that 1t is indeed close to the theoretical value of unity in many peri-
ods and seems relatively stable prior to 2008. Second, this parameter stability does
not last until the end of our sample period. The parameter size for all maturities
dropped sharply after Lehman Shock. Although there is some recovery in the para-
meters afterwards, they dropped again in 2011 when the Greek debt crisis resumed
and adversely a¤ected other European countries such as Ireland, Italy and Spain.
Thus, this gure shows that the recent rise in the forward premium puzzle is closely
associated with the Lehman Shock and the European sovereign debt crisis. In the
next section, we shall carry out a similar analysis but using an indirect approach.
4 CIRP Deviations and the Forward Premium
Puzzle
Rather than investigating directly the size of 1 in Eq. 1, this section seeks evidence
of the puzzle by looking into deviations from the CIRP. In particular, as discussed, a
signicant negative departure from this condition becomes evidence of the increased
importance of the risk premium (Rp) since Rp can be expressed as a linear function
of CIPR deviations (see Eq. 2).
Furthermore, assuming that a proxy for nancial market uncertainty () is pos-
itively associated with Rp:
Rpt = f(t) where f
0 > 0 (4)
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Then, Eq. 2 and 4 show that an increase in nancial uncertainty will raise the risk
premium and reduce CIRP deviations. This becomes equivalent to a decline in 1 in
Eq. 1 from the theoretical value of unity, other things being constant. One statistical
advantage of this method is that there is no causality issue between the forward
premium and interest rates. Since some banks are known to o¤er interest rates which
are derived from the forward premium, the endogeneity bias may be potentially
problematic in Eq. 1. Interestingly, this approach has not been implemented in
previous research analyzing the forward premium puzzle. Here by applying the
Markov-switching (MS) model with time-varying transition probabilities to CIRP
deviations, we shall analyze from a di¤erent perspective, whether indeed the forward
premium puzzle becomes signicant during crisis periods.
Before applying the MS model, we shall check the basic time-series properties
of CIRP deviations. First, in order to understand the stationarity of the data, we
carry out the most conventional unit root test (i.e., the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) test) as well as the Ziot-Andrews test which considers a possible regime shift
in time-series data and where shift-dates are determined endogenously. Both tests
examine the null of the unit root against the alternative of the stationarity, and
a large negative statistic becomes evidence against the null. Here in addition to
a di¤erent specication for the ADF test (i.e., with/without the time trend), two
forms of the Ziot-Andrews test are examined: Models A and B. While Model A
includes a shift in the intercept, Model B considers a shift in the time trend.
The t statistics from the unit root tests (Table 4) suggest that CIRP deviations
generally are stationary regardless of the maturity length. The null hypothesis of the
unit root is rejected in most cases although somewhat weaker evidence is provided
for longer maturities. Given that CIRP deviations are a linear function of Rp,
our results imply a stationarity of risk premiums which is consistent with previous
studies (Nagayasu 2011) utilizing other currency pairs.
Second, a further statistical test is conducted to provide evidence of nonlinearity
in the CIRP in the context of the MS model with the constant transition probabil-
ities. The LM test expressed in terms of a 2 statistic (Davies 1987) is applied to a
two regime MS model with constant terms and raises strong evidence of nonlinearity
in the system (Table 5) by rejecting the null hypothesis of parameter stability at the
1% signicance level. This is consistent with our preliminary analysis using para-
meter stability tests (Table 3), and provides evidence overall in favor of a nonlinear
model.
Next, in order to identify the timing and duration of crises, we employ the MS
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model with time-varying transition probabilities. There are a number of attractive
features in this statistical method. First, being di¤erent from the traditional con-
stant transition probability model,8 our model allows for transition probabilities to
be dependent upon exogenous economic variables. Furthermore, since these eco-
nomic variables are chosen by researchers and contain information about the timing
of structural breaks, it helps us interpret regimes. Second, while time-varying pa-
rameters can be calculated using the standard state space model like before, the
MS model allows us to obtain regime- (rather than time-) specic estimates and
conclusions. Third, the MS model can also prove useful since unobservable regime
type will be identied endogenously by the data.
The time-varying transition probability model was introduced by Filardo (1994)
and Diebold et al (1994) and is often used to model US business cycles. In Filardo
(1994) for instance, the di¤usion index, interest rates and stock prices are used to
obtain the time-varying transition probabilities. Furthermore, Peria (2002) applied
this model to studying speculative attacks during the crisis of the European Mon-
etary System, where transition probabilities are designed to be inuenced by the
level of foreign exchange market pressure. A recent development in this model is
the application of Bayesian statistics as an estimation method rather than the tra-
ditional maximum likelihood method. But this paper uses the traditional method
since we did not confront di¢ culties in nding an optimum point during estimation.
First, consider a constant transition probability (pij) model where a random
variable st contains information about a regime type with integer values (i.e., j =
1; 2; :::; N). The Markov chains suggest that the probability of st+1 depends only on
its past value (it).
Pfst+1 = jjst = itg = pij (5)
For N regimes, the transition matrix which contains all possible pij can be ex-
pressed as:
P =
266664
p11 p12 ::: p1N
p21 p22
...
. . .
p
N1
P
NN
377775 (6)
where
PN
j=1 pij = 1. This is a constant transition probability model which is
widely used in many areas of economic research.
8See Hamilton (1994) for detailed explanations of the constant transition probability model.
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For the time-varying transition probabilities (pijt), Eq. 5 will be re-written as:
Pfst+1 = jjst = it; j
t+1g = pijt+1 (7)
where 
t+1 is the information available at time t+1 and is a vector of exogenous
variables which determine the transition probabilities and regime type. Similarly,
Eq. 6 can be re-expressed as:
Pt =
266664
p11t p12t ::: p1Nt
p21t p22t
...
. . .
pN1t PNNt
377775 (8)
where
p1j;t = q1j;t (9)
p2j;t = (1  q1j;t)q2j;t
...
pNj;t = (1  q1j;t)(1  q2j;t)    (1  qN 2j;t)(1  qN 1j;t)
where qij;t = 
 

ijtb
0
ij

and  is the cumulative normal distribution function for
the estimated probabilities that ensures that p ranges from zero to one.
We follow the previous research using the time-varying transition probability
model and assume two regimes in the system (st 2 1; 2). This assumption is widely
used in applied research partly because it is easier to interpret regimes (e.g., tranquil
and turmoil periods) and also it helps reduce computational di¢ culties. As will
become clear later, Regime 1 refers in this paper to a tranquil period and Regime 2
a crisis period.
In the two regime model, the probability of remaining in Regimes 1 and 2 can
be expressed following Raymond and Rich (1997) as:
Pfst = 1jst 1 = 1;
tg = q11t = 
 
t 1b(1)

(10)
Pfst = 2jst 1 = 2;
tg = p22t = 
 
t 1b(2)

where 
 contains the lagged proxy for nancial market uncertainty (), which
thus determines regime type endogenously in this paper. As a proxy for , we con-
sider a variable known as the nancial market volatility (or crisis) index; namely,
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the EURO STOXX 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXXI). This index follows a similar
compilation methodology to the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
(CBOEV), and its increases are viewed as representing higher uncertainty or volatil-
ity (in the following 30 days) in the prices of the benchmark index (EURO STOXX
50) which is closely linked with options values.9 We use this index since it is closely
associated with European nancial market uncertainty and crises, and we expect
that when this index increases, extra returns (i.e., the risk premium) are required
for investment. One advantage of this index is that the data are discrete but give
us more timely information about the level of nancial chaos compared with, for
example, credit ratings. This proxy is shown in Fig. 2, and indicates that high
nancial uncertainty exists at times of stock market downturns such as those due to
the burst IT bubble (2000-01), the September 11 attacks (2001), the aftermath of
the Lehman Shock (2008), and the Greek sovereign debt problem (2011 onwards).
In short, our two-regime MS model with time-varying transition probabilities
applied to CIRP deviations (Dev) can be summarized as:
Devt = (st) + ut; ut s N(0; 2(st)) where st 2 1; 2 (11)
where  presents an intercept and s suggests that this intercept will be estimated
for Regimes 1 and 2. Furthermore, unlike Filardo (1994), our model considers
regime-specic variance (2(st)), and it is to be expected that volatility would be
higher during the crisis period compared with normal circumstances due to the
increased ow of new information in the former period. The estimation is carried
out by maximizing the following log likelihood function:
log f(Dev2; Dev3; :::; DevT jDev1;) =
TX
t=2
log f(DevtjIt 1;) (12)
where is a vector of parameters to be estimated and It 1 contain all information
on previous CIRP deviations (i.e., Devt 1; :::; Dev2; Dev1).
Table 6 summarizes the results from the MS model with time-vary transition
probabilities and, provides clear evidence to support a multiple regime model. First,
the variance terms in di¤erent regimes have a sizable di¤erence. Notably, the vari-
ance in the crisis period (Regime 2) is higher than that at normal times (Regime 1),
which conrms that Regime 2 contains observations during economic turmoil.
The constant terms () are also very di¤erent among regimes. Following stan-
9See the Chicago Board Options Exchange (2009) about compilation methodology.
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dard presentation style in the literature, these parameters are presented as (1) and
(1) + (2), and (1) is signicantly positive, regardless of the maturity length, in
Regime 1. In contrast, (1) + (2) turns out to be negative and often statistically
signicant. It follows that during economic turmoil (i.e., Regime 2), the deviation
from the CIRP condition decreases (or a large negative number) on average, that
indicates the increased level of the risk premium (Rp).10 This is consistent with
the expected relationship between our denition of nancial turmoil () and the
risk premium, and serves as an explanation of the forward premium puzzle (i.e.,
downward biased 1 in Eq. 1).
Furthermore, the parameters in () are often negative, and either b(1) or b(2) is
signicant except for the one month maturity.11 Their negative sign conrms that
increases in nancial uncertainty in Europe lead to decreases in CIRP deviations,
again serving as an explanation of the forward premium puzzle.
The timing and duration of regimes are illustrated in Figures 3a and 3b using
smoothed probabilities for Regimes 1 and 2 respectively. The smoothing technique
essentially replaces the probability of a state at time t based on information at time
t with information from an entire period (T ).12 According to Figure 3b, while there
are some variations in the timing and duration of crises among maturity lengths
particularly prior to 2008, there is quite clear consistency after the Lehman Shock.
For a majority of time periods after 2008, smoothed probabilities have become more
persistent than before and suggest that the economy is often in a crisis period.
The probabilities for each regime are also provided in Table 6, which suggests a
higher probability for Regime 1 than Regime 2 (i.e., P_11 vs P_22). The average
duration for Regime 1 is obtained as 1=(1   P_11), and that for Regime 2 as
1=(1   P_22). To be consistent with a higher probability of remaining in Regime
1, the average duration for Regime 1 is calculated often as over 2 time periods (or 2
months) and as less than 2 time periods for Regime 2. This relatively short average
duration in both regimes implies high volatility in the risk premiums over time, and
this similar length of regimes is due to a series of economic and nancial crises after
the sub-prime loan problem and Lehman Shock.
10Since the parameter sign for b(1) and b(1) + b(2) is di¤erent and is statistically signicant, we
can conclude that b(1) and b(2) are statistically di¤erent without a further test.
11Instead of European nancial market uncertainty, a proxy for the US counterpart could be
used for the analysis.
12See Wang (2009) for details of the MS model estimation.
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5 Conclusion
Using data including the recent crisis periods, this paper re-evaluates the forward
premium puzzle for the Euro exchange rate which has close links with the Lehman
Shock and the European sovereign-debt crisis. Unlike previous studies, we examine
this puzzle from two perspectives; a traditional approach analyzing the sensitivity
of interest rate di¤erentials to the forward premium, and the other looking into the
size and sign of CIRP deviations. Furthermore, in order to deal with the e¤ects of a
number of nancial crises on the estimates, we applied the time-varying parameter
model which helps us draw a time- or regime-specic conclusion.
Then, we provide evidence that the forward premium puzzle has become more
signicant during the Lehman Shock and thereafter. The parameter for interest
rate di¤erentials drops substantially to a level well below the theoretical value of
unity. Similarly, there was a sizable decline (i.e., a negative increment) in CIRP
deviations during the recent nancial market turmoil, and the direction of changes
in the CIRP is discussed as consistent with the forward premium puzzle. In other
words, an increase in nancial uncertainty in Europe will raise its risk premium,
which will yield a downward bias on the parameter of the interest rate di¤erential.
Thus, this study provides further evidence to Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) who
distinguished the validity of the interest parity condition between developed and
developing countries, and suggests that, even with the same pair of countries, the
validity of the CIRP and the forward premium puzzle is very much dependent upon
economic conditions.
Finally, our results also have some implications for a study on the integration
of the world nancial market. The CIRP condition has often been regarded as
the most appropriate measure of market integration in the past (Frankel 1992).
Yet our ndings imply that one needs to exercise some caution about using the
standard CIRP as a measure of international capital market integration. A rising
risk premium, rather than change in administrative law, is the main driving force of
the recent CIRP deviations since there was no major nancial regulation imposed
during this period in these countries.
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Appendix
Data Sources
 Forward exchange rates: Data for the maturity lengths of one, two, three, six,
nine and twelve months are downloaded from DataStream.
 Spot exchange rates: Bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis the USD are sourced
from DataStream.
 Interest rates: LIBOR interest rates for the maturity lengths of one, two, three,
six, nine and twelve months are downloaded from DataStream.
 Financial market volatility index: the volatility index for Euroland, which mea-
sures expectations of volatility in a major stock price index ( EURO STOXX
50) is downloaded from DataStream.
Kalman Filter
The Kalman ltering method is widely used in many research elds.
Let us write Eq. 4 using bt = (; t)
0 as
Yt = Xtbt + vt
bt = bt 1 + wt
where vt  N(0; Vt) and wt  N(0;Wt), and the initial condition is assumed to
be b0jD0  N(m0; C0), where D0 is the information set available at time 0. Then
the posterior for bt 1 is bt 1jDt 1  N(mt 1; Ct 1), and the prior for bt isbtjDt 1 
N(mt 1; Rt), where Rt = Ct 1+Wt. The one-step ahead forecast for Y is YtjDt 1 
N(ft; Qt) where ft = Xtmt 1 and Qt = X2tRt + vt. In short,
bt
Yt
jDt 1

 N

mt 1
ft

;

Rt RtXt
XtRt Qt

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Table 1. Basic statistics for the covered rate interest parity condition
Obs Mean SE Min Max
fp1M 160 -0.283 1.440 -2.935 1.963
fp2M 160 -0.276 1.403 -2.825 1.956
fp3M 160 -0.278 1.392 -2.874 1.946
fp6M 160 -0.281 1.362 -2.780 1.899
fp9M 160 -0.294 1.325 -2.763 1.873
fp12M 160 -0.315 1.286 -2.782 1.794ei1M 160 -0.160 1.449 -2.968 2.152ei2M 160 -0.153 1.449 -2.794 2.113ei3M 160 -0.136 1.462 -2.949 2.188ei6M 160 -0.157 1.440 -2.844 2.121ei9M 160 -0.180 1.422 -2.792 2.226ei12M 160 -0.213 1.402 -2.849 2.266
Note: fp is the forward premium, ei is the interest rate di¤erential, and SE is the
standard error. Annualized rates.
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Table 3. Covered interest parity relationships
M1 M2 M3 M6 M9 M12
Full Sample
Const -0.128 -0.131 -0.152 -0.135 -0.130 -0.124
(0.028) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)ei 0.968 0.948 0.932 0.927 0.914 0.897
(0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
H0: ei = 1(t-value) -2.000 -3.714 -5.231 -5.615 -6.615 -7.357
Instability test
Andrews-Quandt 44.409 53.869 60.277 50.313 40.589 35.306
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Andrews-Ploberger 19.509 24.550 27.405 22.778 18.422 16.402
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Break date 2008M9 2008M9 2008M9 2008M9 2008M9 2008M9
1998M11-2008M8
Const 0.003 -0.004 -0.013 0.001 -0.008 -0.015
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011)ei 1.028 1.004 0.992 0.990 0.973 0.956
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
H0: ei = 1(t-value) 4.000 0.667 -1.143 -2.500 -5.400 -6.286
2008M9-2012M4
Const -0.219 -0.235 -0.308 -0.258 -0.185 -0.115
(0.054) (0.064) (0.073) (0.078) (0.065) (0.055)ei 0.700 0.705 0.744 0.708 0.640 0.560
(0.126) (0.139) (0.141) (0.134) (0.116) (0.105)
H0: ei = 1(t-value) -2.381 -2.122 -1.816 -2.179 -3.103 -4.190
Note: p-values for the instability test are based on Hansen (1997). The standard
error is shown in parentheses. Parameters which are signicant at the 5% level or
higher are in italics.
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Table 4. Unit root tests applied for CIRP Deviations
Variables ADF Ziot-Andrews
Const Const+Trend Model A Model B
DevM1 -4.117 ** -5.008 ** -5.636 ** -5.434 **
DevM2 -3.352 * -4.415 ** -5.214 * -4.821 **
DevM3 -2.905 * -4.744 ** -6.223 ** -5.480 **
DevM6 -3.460 * -4.911 ** -6.156 ** -6.336 **
DevM9 -2.842 + -3.912 * -4.464 -4.566 *
DevM12 -2.672 + -4.117 ** -4.777 + -4.796 *
Note: The null hypothesis of nonstationarity is tested against the alternative
of stationarity. Dev is CIRP deviations. The lag length is determined by the
Akaike Information Criterion with the maximum of 12. The statistical signicance
is indicated by ** (1%), *(5%) and +(10%).
Table 5. The LR statistics for parameter stability
Davis (1987)
LR p-value
DevM1 187.35 0.000
DevM2 338.24 0.000
DevM3 413.74 0.000
DevM6 426.92 0.000
DevM9 387.77 0.000
DevM12 363.96 0.000
Note: Dev is CIRP deviations.
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Table 6. Results from the MS model with time-varying transition probabilities
M1 M2 M3 M6 M9 M12
2(1) 0.078 0.023 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.019
se 0.017 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2(2) 1.705 1.597 1.401 1.560 1.681 1.658
se 0.193 0.217 0.226 0.401 0.462 0.421
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1) 0.418 0.466 0.534 0.492 0.459 0.456
se 0.038 0.019 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.017
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1) + (2) -0.600 -0.599 -0.797 -0.805 -0.721 -0.652
se 0.331 0.325 0.285 0.299 0.303 0.312
p 0.072 0.067 0.006 0.008 0.018 0.039
b(1) 0.241 -1.173 -0.096 -0.134 -0.109 -1.163
se 0.245 0.505 0.143 0.137 0.158 0.497
p 0.326 0.022 0.503 0.330 0.491 0.021
b(2) -1.469 -0.459 -1.104 -1.074 -1.014 -0.440
se 0.890 0.320 0.442 0.539 0.509 0.320
p 0.101 0.153 0.014 0.048 0.048 0.171
P_11 0.463 0.674 0.515 0.521 0.517 0.673
P_22 0.286 0.430 0.335 0.340 0.348 0.433
Duration(1) 1.862 3.067 2.062 2.088 2.331 3.058
Duration(2) 1.401 1.754 1.504 1.515 1.534 1.764
Note: Based on Eq. 10 and 11. The number in ( ) refers to regime type.
22
  
Figure 1. Time-varying β1 
 
Note: M1 to M12 represent parameters (β1) for a maturity of 1 to 12 months. 
 
Figure 2. A proxy for European financial market uncertainty 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3a. Smoothed transition probabilities for Regime 1 
 
Figure 3b. Smoothed transition probabilities for Regime 2 
 
